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THE ROLE OF COMMERCIALLY PROVIDED 
SECURITY IN AFRICA’S PATRIMONIAL 
SECURITY COMPLEX 
 
 
Christopher Kinsey1, Andreas Krieg2 
 
 
Introduction 
Applying Western liberal models of civil-security sector relations to the highly 
complex and factionalized security sector on the African continent is difficult. 
Unlike the security sector in Western liberal states whose control is widely 
monopolized by the institutions of the state and society3, the security sector in 
Africa has never been structured around the concept of security as a public good 
provided by the state on behalf of or for the protection of a societal public 
sphere as a whole. On a continent where ethnic, tribal or religious groups have 
been assigned to artificial territorial entities by colonial powers, the Western 
notion of an integral nation state built around a public consciousness of 
togetherness has been widely alien to most of the African states and societies4. 
Consequently, post-colonial states and its civilian leaderships have rarely 
created a security sector, which is inclusive, representative of domestic social, 
ethnic, religious or tribal fault lines and undisputed in regulating violence. 
Instead, African security sectors, whether public or private, have been built 
1 Professor of the Department of War and Defence Studies, King’s College, London. E-mail: 
  ckinsey.jscsc@defenceacademy.mod.uk. 
2 Department of War and Defence Studies, King’s College, London. E-mail: andreas.krieg@kcl.ac.uk. 
3 Elke Krahmann, States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 11. 
4 See Christopher Clapham, “African Security Systems: Privatization and the Scope for Mercenary 
Activity,” in The Privatization of Security in Africa, eds. Greg Mills and John Stremlau, 23-46 
(Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1999), 25. 
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around patrimonial networks that by controlling the provision of security 
ensured that security is provided as an exclusive private good benefitting those 
elites embedded in such networks.  
 With the concept of public security generally absent in Africa and a 
factionalized security sector of both state and non-state actors delivering 
security exclusively to certain groups affiliated with patrimonial elites, this 
paper examines the role of commercial providers of security within African 
security sectors. In factionalized security sectors with limited territorial reach, 
the state unable or unwilling to provide security as a public good within its 
boundaries has long lost its monopoly to control violence. It is against this 
backdrop that this paper asks the question to what extent commercial providers 
of security in Africa add another dimension to an already complex non-public 
security sector dominated by de-publicized statutory and non-statutory 
security providers. Thereby, this paper focuses on the degree to which 
commercial providers of security are embedded into patrimonial networks 
catering for exclusive private security interests of certain elites. Focusing on the 
issue of the private or public nature of commercially provided security in Africa 
through the prism of normative theory, this paper neither intends to make a 
moral value judgment about the legitimacy of commercially provided security 
in Africa nor intends to relativize the private patrimonial nature of 
commercially provided security as a phenomenon inherent in African civil-
security sector relations. This paper rather tries to lay an exploratory 
foundation for the understanding of the interests driving commercial providers 
of security in Africa.  
 This paper starts by establishing the theoretical framework that will be 
used to define the public and private nature of security. We will then outline 
the particular civil-security sector relations in Africa that shape the private and 
public nature of African security. Based on the Angolan commercial market for 
security, we will subsequently analyze to what extent commercial providers of 
security are embedded into already existing patrimonial power networks in 
African states.  
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Conceptualizing the Nature of Security  
The concept of security as either a public or private good can be approached 
from various angles. In reference to the alleged commoditization of security, in 
particular the private and public nature of security has been defined on basis of 
economic public good theory5.  Public good theory assesses the nature of a good 
based on excludability and rivalry in order to determine whether it ought to be 
provided by a private or a public provider6. To that end, public good theory can 
make a contribution to understanding the commoditization of security, 
however, it fails to grasp the inherent socio-political connotation of the terms 
public and private. Therefore, when setting out to conceptualize the nature of 
security one ought to take a more liberal theoretical approach to security, 
instead of establishing the assessment of the private or public nature of security 
on the question of who provides it but more importantly who benefits from it. 
The relevance of the question about the private and public nature of security 
arises from a widely normative debate in political science and international 
relations literature7. The literature tries to assess the legitimacy of publicly and 
privately provided security in an era of increased non-state actor involvement 
in local, national and global security sectors. Hence, as the legitimacy of 
security is often linked to the state’s normative prerogative to monopolize the 
control as well as authority over and sometimes even ownership of security, the 
debate about the public and private nature of security lies at the heart of the 
normative effort to delineate the legitimacy of security. In this respect, the 
conceptualization of the nature of security ought to be founded on a reference to 
5 Elke Krahmann, “Security: Collective Good or Commodity?” European Journal of International 
Relations No. 14 (2008): 379-404. 
6 Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern, “Defining Global Public Goods,” in Global Public 
Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, eds. Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. 
Stern, 2-19 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3.  
7 See Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Stanford 
University Press, 1999); Krahmann, “Security: Collective Good or Commodity?”; Elke Krahmann, 
“Private Security Companies and the State Monopoly on Violence: A Case of Norm Change?” PRIF 
Reports No. 88 (2009); Anna Leander, “Conditional Legitimacy Reinterpreted Monopolies: 
Globalisation and the Evolving State Monopoly on Legitimate Violence” (Paper, ISA, 2002); Herbert 
Wulf, “The Bumpy Road to Re-Establishing a Monopoly of Violence” (Paper, LSE, 2005); Alyson 
Bailes, Ulrich Schneckener and Herbert Wulf,  “Revisiting the State Monopoly on the Legitimate Use 
of Force,” DCAF Policy Papers No. 24 (2007): 19-26; van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1991). 
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liberal theory, such as the liberal Social Contract and the thereof arising 
Huntingtonian theorization of civil-security sector relations.   
 Conceptually the terms public and private can be traced back to the 
Ancient Greek dichotomy between the oikos, meaning ‘house’ or ‘household’, 
and the polis, namely the polity8. Etymologically, the terms public and private 
are derivates of the Latin poplicus, meaning ‘of the people’, and privatus, 
meaning ‘withdrawn from public life’9. The public sphere then describes a 
communal sphere concerned with the public interests of all individuals within 
an association. In contrast, the private sphere is concerned with the 
particularistic interests of individuals and households withdrawn from the 
interests of the community at large. Therefore, the prerequisite for a public and 
private sphere to emerge is the existence of a community. Through the 
establishment of a central regulatory authority, this community protects its 
public interests and the private interests of individuals who are members of this 
community.  
 Liberal Social Contract theory provides the theoretical framework to 
conceptualize the relationship between the individual, the society and the state. 
According to Hobbes, mankind is born into a state of nature in which the 
individual is left exposed to the perils of anarchy in absence of a central 
regulatory authority10. It is the individual’s desire to enhance its private 
security, defined by Locke as the individual’s desire for protection of its family’s 
and clan’s life, liberty and estate11, that leads the individual to associate with 
other individuals to form a larger association for the mutual protection of the 
interests of all those constituting the association. The individual’s desire for 
private particularistic security lays the foundation for the formation of a state 
through a social contract with the purpose to ensure the mutual security of all 
members of a society12. Thus, while the individual in the anarchic state of 
nature is concerned with providing private security for itself, its family or clan, 
the state ought to provide public security inclusively for all members of the 
8 J. Roy, “'Polis' and 'Oikos' in Classical Athens,” Greece & Rome Vol. 46, No. 1 (April 1999): 1. 
9 See Oxford Dictionary. 
10 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Sioux Falls: Nuvision Publications, 2004), 74. 
11 John Locke, The Two Treatises of Government. Essay Two (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1980), Ch. IX, § 123. 
12 Hobbes, Leviathan, 99. 
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society it serves. With the state’s monopolization of the legitimate authority 
over violence, the state withdraws the individual’s private right to resort to 
violence in the state of nature in exchange for the promise to protect the 
individual in a public state of security. Thus, the state’s monopolization of the 
legitimate authority over violence provides the foundation for the publicisation 
of security13. Thereby, the legitimacy of a state and its monopoly on the 
legitimate authority over violence depends on its ability to provide public 
security inclusively for all members of society from both internal and external 
threats14. Good governance in this respect is characterized by the degree of 
public inclusiveness with which the state is able or willing to protect the 
interests of the public. Whereas arguably no state has ever achieved full 
inclusiveness in the provision of public security, Western liberal states have 
come close to providing security inclusively for every individual, group or 
minority within their societies15.   
 In order for the state to be able to provide public security it relies on 
the domestic security sector. Traditionally the state’s domestic security sector 
ought to be regulated by the state to ensure that all state-owned and non-
statutory forces providing security do so inclusively without violating the 
public security of all individuals within its boundaries. According to 
Huntington, particularly the public security sector, namely the military, law 
enforcement and intelligence services, is conceived as a public servant of state 
and society and ought to be controlled by the public16. To that end, Huntington 
ascribes the statutory forces a professional raison d’être, which revolves around 
the realization that it has to use its skills according to a set of professional 
values to protect public security interests above private individual, group or 
partisan politics17. In fact, the public security sector ought to be politically 
disconnected from the civilian leadership allowing for the public security sector 
13 Clapham, “African Security Systems,” 23. 
14 Herbert Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States (New York: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 
9. 
15 Clapham, “African Security Systems,” 25. 
16 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(London: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
17 Mathurin C. Houngnikpo, Guarding the Guardians: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Governance 
in Africa (London: Ashgate, 2010), 76. 
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to not only serve a particular government but to serve the public at large. The 
required clear division between the civilian sphere and the public security sector 
ought to ensure that the latter remains a servant of society and state fully 
accountable to societal public scrutiny18. Therefore, the conceptualization of 
civil-security sector relations in liberal theory rests on the assumption that the 
public security sector is constitutionally integrated into the organization of a 
liberal state, which rules with the public consent of a liberal society. 
Traditionally, the absence of a liberal dimension in one of the trinity’s 
components19, namely society, state or security sector, appears to obstruct the 
proper provision of security as a public service in the inclusive interests of all 
individuals within a society. 
 In sum, in order to conceptualize the public and private nature of 
security one has to understand whose security interests are served. From a 
liberal theoretical point of view, private security describes security that is 
provided not inclusively on behalf of a societal public, but exclusively for the 
protection of private individual, group or partisan lives, liberties or estates. It 
follows that public security is concerned with the inclusive protection of the 
lives, liberties and estates of a public, namely an association of individuals 
managed by the regulatory authority of a state acting on behalf and with the 
consent of this association.  
 
 
The Nature of Security in Africa 
Trying to provide a holistic account of the nature of security on the African 
continent will inevitably result in generalizations. Some African states do better 
than others in creating inclusive public security sectors. Also, the status quo of 
civil-security sector relations can change quickly on a continent, which has a 
long history of political, social, economic, or ethnic unrest20. Nonetheless, 
18 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 81. 
19 According to liberal theory, the provision of security ought to be founded on a civil-security sector 
complex consisting of liberal society, liberal state and its agent the security sector. This civil-security 
sector complex is referred to by Clausewitz as the ‘trinity’, which guarantees that particularly in war 
security is provided as a public good benefiting society’s security interests. See Carl von Clausewitz, 
Vom Kriege. Book 1 (Berlin: Ferdinand Dümmler, 1832-34) Ch. 1, § 28. 
20 Howe, Ambiguous Order, 2. 
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African states all share a common legacy that until today shapes the way 
African societies relate to their states and security sectors: a colonial history 
creating the geographic, ethnic and political reality on the continent. Most 
African states did not emerge as a result of a genuine free will of individuals 
with a common history, language, religion or ethnicity to form a public 
association, but are the result of an external carve-up of the continent for mere 
administrative purposes by colonial powers21. As a consequence, many African 
states today are highly pluralistic entities in terms of their citizen’s ethnic, 
religious, lingual or tribal affiliations that often take precedence over a sense of 
national belonging22. The individual’s feeling of affiliation with a public entity 
is therefore commonly undermined by pervasive forms of subnational non-
public affiliations. To some extent this stands in stark contrast to the 
individual’s integration into its community and sense of serving its community 
in Africa of pre-colonial times. Although not being part of a public liberal 
society administered by a state, Africans in the pre-colonial era demonstrated 
strong affiliations with their more homogenous communities willing to take up 
arms to provide security in defence of the public23, 24. Thus, as feelings of 
national affiliation have been traditionally alien to African societies, those 
states that emerged from the colonial era were confronted with the task to 
cultivate a sense of public belonging beyond subnational identities so as to 
create realms of inclusive public security for all individuals within their 
boundaries. However, security sectors in Africa have rarely been public in 
nature for both societies and states have lacked a sense of public cohesiveness 
and mutual responsibility towards fellow individuals within the public 
association. Subsequently, 
 
The management of security by at least a substantial number of African states is in 
practice essentially 'private’, in that such security as exists is primarily concerned 
to protect the lives, power and access to wealth of specific groups and individuals 
21 Clapham, “African Security Systems,” 25. 
22 Howe, Ambiguous Order, 12. 
23 Ramkrishna Mukherjee, Uganda, A Historical Accident?, 10 ff. 
24 Robert E. Edgerton, Africa’s Armies: From Honour to Infamy. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002), 17. 
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who control the state, and is not substantially different from the security provided, 
say, by a warlord who is not formally recognised as representing a state.25 
 
 Both state and non-state security providers have done little to provide 
security inclusively as a public good in Africa. In the following sections we will 
discuss how state and non-state actors shape the nature of security in Africa. 
 
State Actors Providing Security in Africa 
 As discussed in the previous section, the liberal ideal of civil-security 
sector relations revolves around civilian control of the security sector as well as 
the public state-owned security sector’s ambition to serve civil-society and state 
to provide security as a public good. In Africa, the public security sector 
consists of statutory forces such as the military, law enforcement or intelligence 
services. In many cases the public security sector is a remnant of the colonial 
era, not providing security inclusively for all individuals within the public 
sphere but exclusively for certain groups or regimes26. Instead of being a true 
servant of the public’s desire for uncompromised protection from domestic and 
external security threats, in the decades following independence African public 
security sectors have increasingly become servants of ruling elites’ 
particularistic private partisan interests. African public security sectors’ failure 
to assume the role of providing security as a public good on behalf of society at 
large can be explained by two instances that have triggered African public 
security sectors to become politicised, as opposed to publicised, guardians of 
partisan private interests. In the first instance, a strong state tries to mitigate 
the influence of the security sector and in the second instance, a strong security 
sector tries to mitigate the influence of the state. 
 Due to the fact that the public security sector commonly constitutes 
the most powerful dimension within a state, autocratic African regimes that 
assumed power after independence were often scared that the public security 
sector might protect the interests of the public rather than the regime’s 
particularistic private interests. Therefore, many post-colonial African regimes 
tried to reshape the domestic public security sector by investing into 
25 Clapham, “African Security Systems,” 24. 
26 Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976), 14-15. 
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commissarism27, namely the attempt to control the public security sector 
through the establishment of parallel competing security forces or various forms 
of ethnic, tribal or partisan favouritism. First, most regimes in post-colonial 
Africa have tried to secure their own private patrimonial interests against 
popular uprisings or internal security sector mutiny by raising parallel private 
security forces as a counterweight to existing public security forces. Rather 
than actually providing security as a public good, such parallel security forces 
provide security as a private good for particular elites close to the regime. 
Examples are former Ghanaian President Nkrumah’s Own Guard Regiment, 
former Congolese President Mobutu’s Division Spéciale Présidentielle or former 
Rwandan President Habyarimana’s Presidential Guard and Interahamwe 
militia28. African regimes have also created powerful intelligence services, which 
are often ethnically, religiously or tribally affiliated with the ruling elites to 
ensure that public security forces were kept in check protecting the private 
interests of a patrimonial ruling elite rather than the interests of the public29.  
Second, authoritarian regimes in Africa have traditionally made efforts to 
separate the security sector from society by forms of ethnic, tribal or partisan 
favouritism. Based on a practice born in the colonial era, regimes have tried to 
establish boundaries between the public security sector and the public they 
ought to protect30. They have done so by filling key positions within the public 
security sector’s leadership with individuals pledging allegiance to the state not 
based on nationality but based on ethnicity, religion, tribe, family or ideology31. 
As a result, the state-owned security sector provides security as a private good 
for the ruling elite sometimes at the expense of minority groups in the public 
that do not affiliate with the private group interests of the regime. The former 
27Kenneth M. Pollack. “The Arab Militaries – The Double Edged Sword,” in The Arab Awakening: 
America and the Transformation of the Middle East, ed. Kenneth M. Pollack (Washington, DC: 
Brookings, 2011), 59. 
28 Howe, Ambiguous Order, 44. 
29Zoltan Barany, The Soldier and the changing State – Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, 
and the Americas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2012), 284. 
30Claude E. Welsh. “Emerging Patterns of Civil Military Relations in Africa: Radical Coups d’état and 
Political Stability,” in African Security Issues: Sovereignty, Stability and Solidarity, ed. Bruce E. 
Arlinghaus (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 129. 
31 Augustine J. Kposowa and J. Craig Jenkins, “The Structural Sources of Military Coups in Postcolonial 
Africa, 1957-1984,” American Journal of Sociology Vol. 99 No. 1 (1993): 130. 
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Ghanaian President Nkrumah did not only enforce a recruitment policy based 
on ethnic favouritism, but also ensured that individuals in the public security 
sector were members of his Convention People’s Party achieving a degree of 
non-public ideological alignment32.  
 The move towards privatization of the public security sector in Africa 
in the years following independence has created highly factionalized security 
sectors, which have accumulated wealth and power through privileged access to 
states that have been corrupted by particular partisan groups and interests. 
Particularly individuals in key positions of the public security sector have 
accumulated private wealth through public patronage and compradorial 
business connections33. Decades of private enrichment, control of key sectors of 
the economy and various forms of favouritism have allowed many public 
security sectors in Africa to consolidate their domestic power. As a consequence, 
much of the public security sector acts now as the guardian of certain regimes’ 
private interests and privileged position34. State owned security providers in 
some African countries have grown so strong so as to become a praetorian force 
obstructing the liberalization of the state as well as the professionalization of 
the state’s security forces. Weak states unable to cope with various domestic 
issues such as economic mismanagement, weak societal integration or ethnic 
and class conflict, were targeted by the state’s owned security forces under the 
false messianic pretence to salvage an infected country from the abyss of 
political incompetence35. Liberalizing states in particular have become 
vulnerable to the praetorian intervention by public security sectors, which are 
anxious about losing their privileged position. As economic stability and public 
order are essential for the legitimacy of a state, regardless of whether liberal or 
not, the failure of Africa’s liberalizing states to provide these public goods often 
results in the removal of liberalizing regimes by the public security sector36. 
32 Barany, The Soldier and the changing State, 284. 
33Robin Luckham, “The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature 
and Issues,” African Studies Review Vol. 37 No. 2 (1994): 38. 
34Mathurinn C. Houngnikpo, Guarding the Guardians: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Governance 
in Africa (London: Ashgate, 2010), 60. 
35 Ibid, 99. 
36John F. Clark, “The Decline of the African Military Coup,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 18 No. 3 (2007): 
154. 
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Signs of domestic political or economic instability become the pretext for the 
consolidation of private security at the expense of public security. 
 Thus, looking back at almost half a century of post-colonial 
independence in Africa, few states were able or willing to create a public state-
owned security sector providing security as an inclusive public good. In fact, 
most public security sectors in Africa have de facto become privatized and de-
publicized as they provide security exclusively as a private good for certain 
ethnic, religious, tribal or partisan factions. Often, security as a private good 
does not only fail to generate inclusive benefits to certain individuals and 
groups but even comes at the expense of those marginalized. That is to say, 
private partisan security becomes a zero-sum game whereby the increased 
security of ruling elites creates growing insecurity for those excluded as the 
latter are arrested, detained, tortured or killed without any public protection37.  
 
Non-State Actors Providing Security in Africa 
In face of the African state’s common failure to assume the role of the 
public servant relying on its state-owned public security sector to provide 
security inclusively on its territory, alternative private security sectors have 
emerged. Resorting to the private use of force has become an alternative means 
for marginalized or terrorized individuals to provide security in anarchical failed 
states that either lost their ability or their willingness to provide public security 
inclusively to all individuals within their territory38. As many African states 
have lost their legitimacy as public actors or their monopoly on the control over 
violence, private actors have assumed the role to provide security as a private 
good for all those left unprotected by corrupted, politicized public security 
sectors39. Due to the fact that the African state has widely disregarded its social 
contractarian duty to provide public security inclusively, many individuals and 
groups have annulled the covenant between society and state returning to the 
provision of private security in a quasi anarchical state of nature. Kieh 
37 Edgerton, Africa’s Armies, 3. 
38 George Klay Kieh and Pita Ogaba Agbese Kieh. “Introduction: The Military Albatross and Politics in 
Africa,” in The Military and Politics in Africa, eds. George Klay Kieh and Pita Ogaba Agbese Kieh. 
(London: Ashgate, 2004), 7. 
39 Luckham, The Military, Militarization, 19. 
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categorizes private providers of security into six different groups that operate in 
African private security sectors by providing security exclusively as a private 
good: secessionists, warlords, populist insurgents, vigilants, ethnic militias and 
mercenaries40.  
 One of the most common private security providers in the highly 
factionalized African states are secessionist groups, which neglected and 
marginalized by their respective state try to break away and create their own 
independent public state41. In 1966 controlled by tribes from Northern Nigeria, 
the Nigerian public security sector turned against members of the Ibo tribes 
excluding them from the realm of public security. In consequence, members of 
the Ibo tribe declared their own state of Biafra in 1967 in the Eastern provinces 
of Nigeria in an attempt to enhance their security42. Although providing 
security as a private good exclusively to members of the Ibo tribe, the newly 
created Biafran armed forces challenging the politicized Nigerian public 
security sector, were able to establish a sense of public security in this new state. 
 Warlordism has become another major source of private security on the 
African continent. Unlike secessionist groups, warlords do not necessarily want 
to break away from existing states. Instead, warlords operate transnationally in 
quasi-states without being constrained in their activities by public security 
sectors43. Warlords are able to create entities of private security by arming 
family or clan members to protect the warlord’s own private interests. The 
failed state of Somalia presents an interesting case whereby a state unable to 
provide public security has allowed warlords to organize security as a private 
good44. 
Populist insurgencies led by charismatic leaders based on an inclusive 
populist agenda are an interesting example of non-state actors potentially 
providing public security in cases where public security sectors fail to do so. As 
40 See George Klay Kieh, “Military Engagement in Politics in Africa,” in The Military and Politics in 
Africa, eds. George Klay Kieh and Pita Ogaba Agbese Kieh. (London: Ashgate, 2004). 
41 Ibid, 47 
42 Edgerton, Africa’s Armies, 104-108 
43 Kaldor, New and Old Wars, 97. 
44 Christopher Kinsey, Stig Jarle Hansen and George Franklin, “The impact of private security 
companies on Somalia's governance networks,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 
1 (2009). 
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grass root movements insurgencies understand that they have to gain 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public at large. Relying on the public for 
intelligence, logistics and recruits, the Ugandan National Resistance Army 
(NRA) invested highly into being perceived as a public force for good in their 
struggle against Obote’s corrupted regime in the early 1980s45. Providing aid, 
infrastructure and public protection from the politicized, factionalized public 
security sector, the NRA as a non-statutory force was able to deliver public 
security inclusively. 
 Kieh further identifies vigilants as another group operating in Africa’s 
private security sectors. As ethno-communal or religious groups trying to 
impose their own norm of ‘law and order’, vigilants feel excluded from the realm 
of public security and decide to take up arms to protect their communities in a 
state of anarchical insecurity46. In the same way, also ethnic militias operate as 
private security providers creating private realms of security for members of 
particular ethnic groups in response to the post-colonial African state’s 
unwillingness or inability to provide inclusive public security.  
 Apart from domestic private providers of security, also mercenaries as 
external private security providers have been involved in Africa’s private 
security sectors. Motivated by private individual profit, mercenaries have a 
long history in Africa being hired locally or abroad to provide private security 
for particular regimes or ethnic, religious and partisan groups. Since the end of 
colonialism mercenaries have taken advantage of the security vacuums in 
Africa to fight for example for Belgian business interests in Congo and British 
45 Maj Charles Kisembo, “The Civil-Military Relations in Countries Emerging From Instabilities in 
Africa: The Challenge for the Security Sector Reform (SSR),” Joint Services Command and Staff College 
Defence Research Paper (2006): 15. 
46 Kieh, “Military Engagement in Politics,” 49. 
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oil interests in Nigeria in the 1960s47, for the CIA in Angola in the 1970s48, for 
Mobutu in Zaire in the 1990s49 or for Ghaddafi in Libya in 201150. 
 Inter alia motivated by profit seeking and therefore often prematurely 
tagged with the mercenary label, private commercial providers of security are 
the most recent phenomenon in Africa’s highly diverse security sectors. Unlike 
mercenaries, contractors working for commercial providers of security 
commonly referred to as private military and security companies (PMSCs), are 
not driven by individual profit but are employees of commercial enterprises 
delivering a diverse range of security services for corporate business profit51. 
Also, unlike mercenaries, PMSCs tend to not involve themselves in political 
intrigue52. Ever since the first modern establishment of commercial providers of 
security in the late 1960s, Africa had been a core market for commercially 
provided private security services53. It was not, however, until the 1990s that 
commercial companies became prominent actors in Africa’s private security 
sectors54. The commercialisation of security in the modern era can be traced 
back to the founding of the British PMSC Watchguard in 1967, which laid the 
foundation for an expanding commercial security industry in the 1980s55. 
Private commercial security in Africa became the subject of public attention 
only with the military operations conducted by the former South African PMSC 
47Angela McIntyre and Taya Weiss, “Weak governments in search of strength – Africa’s experience of 
mercenaries and private military companies,” in From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and regulation 
of private military companies, eds. Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 68. 
48 Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. ‘Kayode Fayemi, “Africa in Search of Security: Mercenaries and Conflicts, 
an Overview,” in Mercenaries: an African Security Dilemma, eds. Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. ‘Kayode 
Fayemi (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 23. 
49 Khareen Pech, “The Hand of War: Mercenaries in the former Zaire,” in Mercenaries: an African 
Security Dilemma, eds. Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. ‘Kayode Fayemi (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 127. 
50 Martin Chulov and David Smith, “Libya: Gaddafi's army of mercenaries face backlash,” The Guardian, 
September 02, 2011.  
51 Christopher Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military 
Companies (London: Routledge, 2006), 64. 
52 Caroline Holmquist, “Private Security Companies: The Case for Regulation,” SIPRI Policy Paper No. 
9 (2005): 9. 
53 Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers, 47. 
54 Adedeji Ebo, “Private Actors and the governance of security in West Africa,” in Private Military and 
Security Companies: Ethics, Policies and Civil-Military Relations, eds. Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter 
Baker and Marina Caparini (London: Routledge, 2008), 144. 
55 Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers, 51. 
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Executive Outcomes (EO) on behalf of the Angolan and Sierra Leonean 
government in 1993 and 199556. Clapham argues that commercial security 
providers such as EO although providing military combat support services in a 
commercial capacity, sometimes can provide security as a public good in 
absence of a willing or potent public security sector to do so57. The reason is 
that private commercial providers of security in Africa, if not employed 
domestically by certain elites, intervene in conflicts as external third parties 
with fewer antagonisms towards certain groups within the public. This allows 
them to potentially provide security more considerately as a public good for all 
individuals within the operational environment – even if public security is just a 
secondary outcome to achieving tasks with primarily private benefits.  
 This section has demonstrated that the liberal ideal of the state 
monopolizing the authority over violence by agreeing to provide public security 
in exchange for the individual’s renunciation of the unauthorized private use of 
violence, is still some way off on the African continent. For most public security 
sectors fail to provide inclusive public security, private security sectors have 
been established to provide security as both public and private goods. The 
nature of security in Africa is thereby determined by a variety of state and non-
state actors that mostly provide security on factionalist terms favouring private 
interests of ethnic, religious, tribal or partisan groups while often failing to 
provide security as a truly public good.  
 
 
The Nature of Commercial Security in Angola 
Eleven years after the end of the civil war Angola finds itself in a state of rapid 
economic growth and steady reconstruction emerging as a regional power in 
Southern Africa. Mostly fuelled by expansive hydrocarbon revenue, Angola’s 
economy has not just recovered from decades of civil war but it has also laid the 
foundation for Angola’s image as a boom country amid regional economic and 
political decay. Extractive industry producing oil and gas in the West and 
diamonds in the East of the country has been the motor for economic growth 
56 Eeben Barlow. Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds (Johannesburg: Galago Publishing, 2008), 295. 
57 Clapham, “African Security Systems,” 44. 
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and growing prosperity particularly for Angola’s urban society. As a 
consequence, the protection of this core industry’s operations has become a 
priority for national security. Unable to provide for the security of extractive 
industries alone, public security sector services have been supplemented by 
commercially provided security services since the early 2000s. Today, Angola 
has one of the largest and highly developed indigenous commercial security 
sectors in Africa, which is closely tied to the country’s mineral resource 
wealth58. Therefore, this section will focus upon Angola as a case study on basis 
of which to examine the nature of commercially provided security on the 
African continent. As a country shaped by an only recently concluded civil war, 
various social and economic sources for domestic instability as well as extensive 
foreign investment into its mineral resource wealth, Angola presents a 
predestined case to explore to what extent commercially provided security in 
Africa is either public or private in nature.  
 Before analyzing the commercial market for security in Angola one has 
to first understand the socio-political reality of the country and its impact on 
the provision of security as either a public or private good. After its release into 
independence from Portugal in 1975, a civil war erupted between three 
liberation movements; the FNLA, the MPLA and UNITA. Supported by 
different social and ideological bases, particularly the latter two movements 
grew into important political players in post-independence Angola. The 
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) was founded by the left-
wing educated urban elite of Portugal-phile assimilados in Angola’s capital 
Luanda and followed a Marxist ideology. The União Nacional para a 
Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) was a liberation movement without a 
clear ideological orientation but a strong rural African base comprising 
individuals from mostly the Ovimbundu and Bakongo tribes in the North and 
East of the country59. Despite short intervals of instable peace, these two 
movements, after partially absorbing members of the FNLA, fought each other 
58 Ulrike Joras and Adrian Schuster, “Private Security Companies and Local Populations: An 
Exploratory Study of Afghanistan and Angola,” Swiss Peace Working Paper No.1 (2008): 45. 
59 Sean Cleary, “Angola: A case study of private military involvement,” in Peace, Profit or Plunder? The 
Privatization of Security in War Torn African Societies, eds. Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason 
(Johannesburg: Institute for Security Studies, 1999), 143. 
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in a brutal civil war lasting for almost three decades dividing the country into 
two spheres of influence, whereby the Western coastal areas were controlled by 
the MPLA and the Eastern rural areas by UNITA. When the civil war came 
finally to an end in 2002, the MPLA under the leadership of President Dos 
Santos emerged victoriously assuming control of the entire country and 
supervising the disarmament of UNITA fighters. Nonetheless, Angola remains 
until this day one of the most militarized countries in Africa, defined not just 
but an extensive circulation of fire arms among the civilian population but also 
one of the largest public security sectors on the continent60. At the heart of 
civil-security sector relations stands a closely knit patrimonial network 
surrounding President Dos Santos, which similar to other African states, has 
developed into a shadow administration controlling all aspects of economic, 
political and security affairs in the country. In executing control over Angolan 
economic, political and security affairs, similar to other regimes in Africa, Dos 
Santos’s administration has primarily not catered for the interests of the public 
but for its own interests. In order to protect his patrimonial system, Dos Santos 
has engaged into extensive coup-proofing over the past decades by creating a 
diversified public security sector, which consists of the National Police, the 
Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), the Military Police, the paramilitary Rapid 
Intervention Police (known as the ‘Black Ninjas’), the Presidential Guard and 
the Organization of Civil Defence61.  Particularly, the Presidential Guard and 
the Rapid Intervention Police are recruited on basis of tribal affiliation ensuring 
that both entities do not establish bonds with the public in the MPLA’s core 
areas around Angola’s capital Luanda. Effectively, Dos Santos has created a 
dual security sector directly controlled by him and the MPLA acting as a 
counterweight to the FAA and regular national police62. While the 
diversification of the public security sector has obstructed plotting against the 
regime and kept certain forces within the FAA in check by creating a buffer 
between potential plotters and the MPLA’s regime, it has rendered the 
60 Alex Vines and Markus Weimer‚ “Assessing Risks to Stability,” Report to the CSIS Africa Program, 
(June 2011): 13 
61Joras and Schuster, “Private Security Companies and Local Populations,” 39. 
62 Paula  Cristina  Roque,  “Angola:   Parallel  Governments,    Oil    and    Neopatrimonial   System   
Reproduction,” Institute for Security Studies Situation Report, June 06, 2011, 4. 
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provision of public security widely ineffective63. Similar to developments in 
public security sectors in other African countries discussed in the previous 
section, the failure of the public security sector in Angola to provide public 
security in some areas of the country has caused civilians to arm themselves to 
provide for their own security. It is against this backdrop that one has to 
approach the analysis of the nature of the commercial security sector in Angola.  
 The history of commercially provided security in Angola dates back to 
the employment of the former South African PMSC Executive Outcomes (EO) 
by the MPLA government between 1993 and 1995. Impressed by the 
operational effectiveness of EO in liberating UNITA held territories, Angolan 
military leaders created their own PMSC, Sociedade de Telecomunicações, 
Segurança e Serviços (TeleService), and laid the foundation for an indigenous 
Angolan market for commercial security64. Among the more than 300 
indigenous companies operating in Angola today, TeleService and Alpha 5 
remain the biggest players on a market characterized by high market 
concentration65. Unlike other commercial security markets even in Western 
countries, Angola has one of the most regulated markets in the world. Through 
the Law on Private Security Companies (19/92) and Diamond Law (16&17/94), 
the Angolan state has reinforced its monopoly on the legitimate authority over 
violence by controlling the market entry and service levels of commercial 
security companies66. In essence, these state-enforced market regulations aim at 
first maintaining state control over commercially provided security and second 
demarcating the scope of private and public security. According to the 
definition laid down in Law (19/92) and (16&17/94), the protection of private 
assets of extractive industries is not a public good provided for by the Angolan 
public security sector but a private good that ought to be provided by private 
commercial providers of security67. Today, Angolan PMSCs predominately 
serve this purpose of catering for the security of extractive industry operations 
in the diamond areas of Lunda Norte & Sul as well as in the oil rich areas along 
63 Wines and Weimer, “Assessing Risks to Stability,” 15. 
64 Cleary, “Angola: A case study,” 147. 
65 Joras and Schuster, “Private Security Companies and Local Populations,” 46. 
66 Lei Sobre as Empresas Privadas de Segurança, Lei no. 19/92 de 31 de Julho (1992).  
67 Joras and Schuster, “Private Security Companies and Local Populations,” 41. 
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the coast. In so doing, it seems at first sight as if commercial providers of 
security in Angola operate detached from the public security sector merely 
protecting private commercial interests of extractive industries. However, when 
looking behind the façade of Angola’s commercial security and extractive 
industry, one finds a complex network of different private and public actors 
who directly or indirectly control the provision of security in the country.  
Similar to other African countries, Angola has a public state-owned 
security sector that has difficulty providing security as an inclusive public good 
for all individuals within the country. The highly diverse public security sector 
has de facto become privatized and de-publicized as the public security sector 
predominately serves the exclusive security interests of certain political and 
military elites close to President Dos Santos. While the Angolan public security 
sector does not deliberately marginalize certain groups based on their political, 
tribal, religious or ethnic affiliation, it has been closely tied into a complex 
network of MPLA, industry and military representatives serving the sole 
purpose of providing security as a private good for those elites. The commercial 
security sector in Angola is embedded into this complex elitist network as well. 
This elitist network is presided over by a presidential clique that de Oliveira 
dubs the ‘futungo’ and that comprises non-elected individuals with close direct 
ties to President Dos Santos68. The futungo holds key positions within Angolan 
extractive industry, the military, the MPLA and ultimately in the commercial 
security sector. The most important asset of the futungo is the giant national 
petroleum company Sonangol, which supplies the presidential patronage 
network with oil money through export revenues and foreign debts run against 
future oil production69. Accounting for 90% of government revenues in the 
1990s, Sonangol, which is controlled by key players in the futungo, allowed the 
presidential clique to misappropriate public money that could be used to erect a 
parallel state structure more powerful than actual public state institutions. 
Thus, the futungo’s private enrichment at the expense of the Angolan public 
mineral resource wealth depends on the security of extractive industry 
68 Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, “Business success, Angola-style: postcolonial politics and the rise and rise 
of Sonangol,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 45 (December 2007): 606. 
69 Ibid. 
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operations, which is guaranteed not just by the public security sector but 
increasingly by the private commercial security sector. That is to say that 
commercial security providers in Angola do not merely provide security for 
private mineral extraction companies but also indirectly for the private 
interests of the regime around President Dos Santos70.  
 Apart from generating exclusive revenues via mineral extraction 
companies, political, military and business elites affiliated with the futungo have 
also discovered the commercial market for security as a lucrative means to 
create income71. The most influential PMSCs in Angola, among them 
TeleService and Alpha 5, are wholly or partially owned by elites close to the 
presidential clique72. Embedded in the patrimonial network tied to the private 
interests of Dos Santos, Angolan commercial providers of security generate 
further economic and political power for the president’s parallel state structure.  
In this respect, the ban of foreign commercial providers of security under Law 
19/92 cannot be understood as merely a means to enhance public state control 
of the market but has to be perceived as a means to enhance the regime’s 
private control of the market for its own benefit73. By revoking the operating 
license of foreign commercial providers of security, the futungo has ensured that 
its share of Angola’s market for commercial security has increased leading to a 
further concentration of political and financial power in the private hands of 
the presidential elite74. The elitist control over the market for commercially 
provided security has a strong impact on the political power of certain elites 
who are able to increase their ability to provide security not as a public good 
but as a private good. As members of the futungo hold key positions in both the 
public and commercial Angolan security sector, the regime has increased its 
leverage in certain areas, especially in the diamond rich East of the country, 
where national police and the FAA have difficulty providing security. In these 
70 Paul Cammack, David Pool and William Tordoff, Third World Politics: A Comparative Introduction 
(New York: Macmillan, 1994), 91.  
71 Alex Vines, Nick Shaxson and Lisa Rimli, “Drivers of Change Angola,” Chatham House Position Paper 
No. 1 (2005). 
72 Herbert Howe, “African Private Security,” Conflict Trends (June 2000): 23. 
73 Patrick Cullen, “Keeping the New Dog of War on a tight leash: Assessing means of accountability for 
Private Military Companies,” Conflict Trends (June 2000): 39. 
74 Joras and Schuster, “Private Security Companies and Local Populations,” 50.  
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parts of Angola, the commercial security sector acting as a far better equipped 
and trained appendix of the public security sector does not merely provide 
private security for extractive industry operations but also generates spill-overs 
to the public sphere by de facto assuming law enforcement functions75. By 
arresting, detaining and flogging illegal miners with impunity, Angolan PMSCs 
operate on behalf of the private interests of those elites who run the parallel 
state and benefit from the extraction of certain mineral resources while 
exercising control in the public sphere. Nonetheless, although mimicking the 
posture of a public security provider and acting under the authority of the 
regime, security provided by PMSCs in mineral resource extraction areas is 
private in nature76. Marginalizing the public security sector, commercial 
providers of security in Angola contribute to the establishment of security in 
the public sphere, which only benefits certain political, military and business 
elites77. In 2007 Human Rights Watch reported an incident whereby 
commercial providers of security were used alongside public security sector 
forces to evict poor residents from an area that was designated by the regime for 
redevelopment. According to HRW PMSC employees made use of heavy fire 
arms to force poor residents from their land while being supported rather than 
constrained by national police and Rapid Intervention Police78. This instance 
demonstrates to what extent commercial providers of security help the regime 
in Luanda to further its private commercial interests sometimes at the expense 
of public security. 
 Circumventing public accountability, PMSCs function as private 
reserve armies for the futungo assisting the personal non-public institutional 
nature of Dos Santos’ regime79. Thereby, commercially provided security has 
become an alternative way for the presidential clique to foster an emancipation 
of security providers from public civil-societal control strengthening the ability 
75 Rafael Marques de Morais, “Private security companies and a parallel State in Angola,” Africa Files 
(December 2007).  
76 Joras and Schuster, “Private Security Companies and Local Populations,” 54. 
77 Morais, “Private Security Companies and a parallel State.” 
78 “They Pushed Down the Houses: Forced Evictions and Insecure Land Tenure for Luanda’s Urban 
Poor.” Human Rights Watch Report Vol. 19, No.7 (2007): 27. 
79Joras and Schuster, “Private Security Companies and Local Populations,” 51. 
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of the regime to provide security for its own private interests. In a country such 
as Angola, where key positions in the public security sector are already being 
held by individuals close to the President, commercial security providers 
contribute to an increased de-publicization of security transforming the nature 
of security in Angola evermore into a private good. As a consequence, security 
in Angola mainly serves a patrimonial network around the President that has 
previously invested into the creation of a parallel private state structure 
constituting the actual power-related centre of gravity in Angola.  
 
 
Conclusion 
As African states widely fail to provide public security inclusively for all 
individuals within their territories, Africa has given birth to one of the fastest 
growing markets for commercially provided security in the world. While in 
Western liberal states the commercialization of security constitutes a major 
paradigm shift, the commercialization of security in Africa follows an already 
common pattern.  
 As this paper has demonstrated, security in Africa has rarely been a 
truly public good inclusively provided by the state on behalf of its society for all 
individuals within their territory. Much more, African states have developed 
into parallel elitist entities not catering for the public needs of all its citizens but 
serving only those tied to the patrimonial network of the regime through 
sectarian or commercial affiliation. In the same way security is commonly not 
been provided as an inclusive public good for the benefit of all, but as a private 
good benefiting only particular elites within a complex of patrimony. The non-
public, private nature of security in Africa relates to two factors: first, it only 
benefits selective groups within the public and often comes at the expense of 
other groups, and second, it is controlled and maintained by sectarian elites tied 
into patrimonial networks. That is to say, regardless of whether security is 
provided by state actors such as the military, police or secret services or by non-
state actors such as warlords, rebel movements or militant religious fractions, 
security on the African continent rarely benefits the security needs of public 
societies as communities bound by territorial boundaries. Commercial providers 
of security appear to fall into the same pattern. Although privately owned and 
striving after business profit, commercial providers of security as private non-
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statutory actors do not necessarily sell their services freely on the public market 
for security. Instead, the commercial security sector functions as a profitable 
commercial entity generating wealth and power for already well-established 
elites close to the ruling regime.  
 Although it is difficult to make general statement about commercial 
security sectors in Africa based on one case study, the case of Angola has 
demonstrated to what extent the domestic commercial security sector is 
embedded into the President’s complex patrimonial network controlling the 
country’s power and wealth. Sometimes mimicking a public posture when 
operating alongside the domestic public security sector, commercial security in 
Angola is dominantly a private good allowing established elites to foster an 
emancipation of security from the oversight and control of the public. To this 
end, commercial security allows the MPLA’s parallel state structure to widen 
the gap between public and private elitist security needs. That is to say, those 
commercial providers of security in Angola have become similar to the 
domestically already existing dual security sector, a counterweight to the 
established public security providers such as the FAA or the national police. 
Rather than trying to coup proof the FAA or national police by undermining its 
integrity through the placement of Dos Santos affiliates into organizational key 
positions, commercially provided security allows the regime to enhance its 
political influence while securing its economic and financial interests. As a 
consequence, African commercial security is private in nature and even though 
generating spill-overs to the public sphere, ultimately serves the private 
sectarian and commercial interests of those already involved in decades of 
patrimony. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on the degree to which commercial providers of security in 
Africa are embedded into patrimonial networks catering for exclusive private 
security interests of certain elites. Focusing on the issue of the private or public 
nature of commercially provided security in Africa through the prism of 
normative theory, this paper rather tries to lay an exploratory foundation for 
the understanding of the interests driving commercial providers of security in 
Africa. 
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